Corporate Social Responsibility and Executives’ Attitudes in Germany, Poland and Hungary

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Abstract
By examining executives’ cognitive concepts of responsibility and the CSR activities of companies in three latecomers to explicit Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) – East and West Germany, Poland and Hungary – we show that the specific contexts matter for both. However, attitudes and activities are not in a deterministic relation. In (West) Germany, a neocorporatist concept of collective regulation is supportive of CSR, and implicit CSR is not driven out by an explicit CSR. In Poland and Hungary, the public discourse on CSR promoted by the EU has led to a ceremonial adoption of CSR by companies, while etatist and minimalist concepts of responsibility are relatively widespread. Substantive CSR is fostered by multinationals and executives who have studied in an Anglo-Saxon country. Yet, this seems not to be a peculiar feature of the Polish and Hungarian ‘dependent market economy’.

Keywords: Poland, Hungary, East and West Germany, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), attitudes of executives, varieties of capitalism, neocorporatism and organized labour, transnationalization

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) regards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a soft-law tool for sustainable development within its open-coordination trajectory (EC 2001). Given the EU’s limitations in the fields of corporate taxation or social policy, CSR promises to institutionalize practices, norms and standards without political fights over joint regulation and without restricting the free market. This mix of motifs has made CSR highly attractive for European politics, at least up until the European financial crisis. In 2001, the European Commission launched a Green Paper to promote a European framework for CSR. Ten years later, the European Commission consolidated its efforts with a ‘Renewed EU strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility’ that founds its continuation in promoting ‘National CSR Programmes’ (EC 2011).

Contemporary CSR refers to voluntary programs and strategies on the part of companies that are explicitly communicated and reported. Although obeying legal requirements is considered an element of CSR (Carroll 1991), ‘individual authorship’ by the companies and an Anglo-Saxon style of voluntary stakeholder involvement are crucial for this kind of ‘explicit’ CSR (Matten and Moon 2008). In recent years, the EU has underlined the obligatory dimension of CSR in their conceptual framework. Companies are held responsible for their ‘impacts on society’, including the respect for legislation, fair employment, social partnership, skill and local development (EC 2011: 6). And yet, the conceptual core of the European understanding of CSR as a new transnational ‘best practice’ is shaped by the Anglo-Saxon style of public investor relations and an individualistic approach towards responsibility (see Hall and Soskice 2001; Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Matten and Moon 2008). For most of Europe explicit CSR has entailed a sizeable institutional innovation with important implications for business culture.

The diffusion of explicit CSR in different institutional contexts and sectors has been widely studied. However, its interaction with specific contexts from a comparative perspective is still underexplored. Although context is usually not only related to formal regulation but also to specific cultural perceptions, the latter is rarely included systematically. Our study aims to contribute to this strand of research by focussing on executives’ attitudes as part of the cultural underpinning of CSR and raising the question of to what extent these attitudes matter in practice.
We selected three latecomers in terms of explicit CSR: Germany (West-East), Poland and Hungary. CSR represents an institutional innovation in all three countries. Germany has long lagged behind other western European countries and has only adopted the contemporary concept of explicit CSR more rigorously from since the late 1990s/early 2000s. Yet, Germany also has a strong institutional and cultural tradition in what the literature calls ‘implicit’ CSR. According to Dirk Moon and Jeremy Matten (2008: 409) implicit CSR ‘consists of values, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory and customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues’. It is collectivist rather than individualist. The Polish and Hungarian public discourse on CSR started only after their EU accession in 2004 and is closely linked to the unfolding of the CSR strategy at EU level (Kooskora 2006; Pálvölgyi et al. 2009). The diffusion of contemporary CSR in Hungary and Poland followed a turbulent commercialization and privatization period. During that time, state enterprises tried to quickly rid themselves of their broad welfare-provision responsibilities – a process that was most thorough in countries with rapid western integration such as Poland and Hungary (Bluhm and Trappmann 2014; Koleva et al. 2010; Kooskora 2006).

The paper starts with a short outline of the conceptual framework (2) and the methodology of the quantitative survey (3). In the empirical part of the paper (4), we proceed in three steps: We first try to detect different cognitive concepts of corporate responsibility that might serve as cultural underpinning for CSR practices (4.1).

In a second step, we investigate the extent to which explicit CSR has taken root in core sectors of these three countries and test whether the cognitive concepts correspond with reported CSR practices. We will show that the different legacies in Poland, Hungary and Germany matter for the concept and practices of CSR (4.2).

In the CSR literature, two factors are identified as of major importance for the diffusion of CSR among countries: transnational influence (mainly: integration in transnational supply chains) and the strength of organized labour. While the former is often viewed as a major driver of explicit CSR, the latter is perceived as a major obstacle for its diffusion. Both arguments challenge a cultural explanation, as a cultural underpinning seems to not be needed. Therefore, in a third step, we estimate the transnational influences and the impact of collective labour arrangements on CSR practices in multivariate regression models (4.3). We explore if the claim for the importance of these two factors receive empirical support and show that in spite of the relevance of such ‘objective’ factors, the socio-cultural dimension of actors cannot be ignored.
1. Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis

The debate on contextualization of CSR is closely linked to the debate on varieties of contemporary capitalism. One strand of research focuses on variation within the developed capitalist world (Gjølberg 2009; Hiß 2009; Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Kinderman 2008, 2012; Koos 2012; Matten and Moon 2008; Meyer 2010). The other strand of literature explores the spreading of contemporary CSR to less developed countries which lack decisive preconditions found in western countries for the implementation of contemporary CSR (Crotty 2012; Dobers and Halme 2009; Lim and Tsutsui 2012; Visser 2008). Poland and Hungary are now part of the EU. Despite some differences, they share with the developed capitalist countries the basic economic and political institutions such as the rule of law, security of property rights and a relative autonomy of the economic sector from politics. These institutions are perceived as crucial for CSR and distinguish these countries from post-socialist versions of state capitalism (Belyaeva 2013; Crotty 2012; Lane 2008). Yet in the manner of their integration in the western markets and institutional system, they clearly differ from the existing varieties of western capitalism (Berniak-Wozny 2010; King and Szelenyi 2005; Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Bluhm et al. 2014), which implies several peculiarities for the implementation of explicit CSR.

The core distinction of the new market economies in Central Eastern Europe from their western counterparts stems from their foreign-led growth model in the course of the transition and EU accession (Myant and Drahokoupil 2013). Key sectors are now significantly more transnational than in other parts of Europe, especially the banking sector. Poland and Hungary along with the Czech Republic and Slovakia restructured their manufacturing sector, which now mainly consists of subsidiaries of western multinationals and their local suppliers. They produce medium-tech durable goods for international markets in a capital-intensive production regime based on skilled labour. That is also why these four countries are sometimes categorized as new ‘dependent market economies’ (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). We may even consider East Germany an extreme case in this respect (Bluhm 2010; Bluhm and Martens 2014). Given the weak labour relations and weak civil society, some authors argue that CSR in Central Eastern Europe mainly occurs via integration in western supply chains rather than by internal pressure or by considerations of domestic managers and entrepreneurs regarding the companies’ role in society (Bondy et al.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Executives’ Attitudes in Germany, Poland and Hungary

2012; Lewicka-Stralecka 2006; UNDP 2007 a/b). This suggests an explicit approach to CSR, if any approach at all.

The hypothesis of multinationals as drivers of CSR can be challenged from two sides. First, empirical studies of CSR in post-socialist Europe indicate that western companies do not automatically promote CSR in their host countries mainly because their investment is cost-driven. Even large multinationals restrict their activities to what they perceive as necessary (Berniak-Wozny 2010; Hennebel and Kalfayan 2006; Piskalski 2009). Given a certain pressure to declare some CSR, this may lead to a ceremonial commitment rather than a substantive one (Lim and Tsutsui 2012). However, Anan (2010) observes serious attempts by companies in Poland to integrate CSR in their business strategy in despite these obstacles.

Second, it is argued that perceptions, organizational values and practices, originating from state socialism, still matter. Several scholars also identify elements of corporatism and a stronger role of the state in post-socialist Central Eastern Europe as having an impact on the perception of CSR and its practices in these countries. They stress the interaction between former and imported standards and practices, and define the ‘rise of CSR’ as a ‘result of a path dependent path shaping process’, i.e. they do not deny the institutional break with the state-socialist role of enterprises but still see legacies at work (Koleva et al. 2010: 276, 281). What this notion implies for the attitudes of executives is underresearched. Qualitative studies indicate a variety of perceptions (see Crotty 2012; Koleva et al. 2010; Iankova 2008; Letica 2008).

For Germany, too, there are conflicting assessments. (West) Germany is portrayed as a strong case of traditional implicit CSR that complements its coordinated market economy (CME). Yet, the German CME underwent drastic institutional changes. Many scholars even argue for an almost complete erosion of the CME, which gained momentum after German re-unification (e.g. Streeck 2009). This institutional change is assumed to be intertwined with a radical change in what executives regard as their responsibility towards the wider society, i.e. a waning of their acceptance of what is perceived as the cultural underpinning of implicit CSR (Hartmann 2006; Imbusch and Rucht 2007). The spreading of contemporary CSR is taken as an indication of the substitution of implicit CSR, rooted in collective bargaining, by an individualistic explicit approach (Hiß 2009; Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Kang and Moon 2012; Kinderman 2008).

Other scholars contest this notion of a substitution of implicit CSR by explicit CSR. Instead, they suggest that collective and formally institutionalized labour arrangements and explicit CSR are not mutually exclusive (Campbell 2007; Gjølberg 2009; Midtun et al. 2006). Qualitative studies in large West German companies
indicate that the diffusion of explicit CSR as a global ‘best practice’ either became a parallel structure to established labour relations or was actively supported by the works councils (Zimpelmann and Wassermann 2012). This seems to confirm the complementarity thesis that Gjølberg (2009) formulated for Nordic multinationals and suggests a greater continuity of implicit CSR in Germany compared to Poland and Hungary.

The research on the contextualization of CSR widely accepts that institutions need interpretation by actors, so that cognitive scripts or models are decisive (North, 1990; Denzau and North, 1994). However, there is little research on cognitive concepts of corporate responsibility in general and of the companies’ leading personnel in particular. Studies on executives’ attitudes are usually restricted to narrow motifs that drive CSR investments. Apart from rare examples (Witt and Redding 2012), it has hardly been explored how executives perceive corporate responsibility. However, this question is crucial if we want to gain a better understanding of the interaction between business cultures and CSR practices.

We conceptualize the attitudes of executives towards corporate responsibility following Archie B. Carroll’s famous pyramid and distinguish between four cognitive concepts of responsibility: the minimalist, liberal, neocorporatist and etatist. The minimalist concept refers to what Carroll (1990: 40–41) calls ‘economic responsibility’ of a company. Making an ‘acceptable profit’ in a capitalist market economy can be seen as the key responsibility of a private company, which everything else rests on. If executives restrict the company’s responsibility to this task, they share a minimalist concept (see also Koleva et al. 2010; Kooskora 2006).

We also distinguish two high CSR-commitment concepts of corporate responsibility: the liberal and the neocorporatist. A liberal concept of corporate responsibility stresses the ‘individual authorship’ of companies and therefore rejects the reliance on collective arrangements; a neocorporatist concept accepts collective self-regulation. Neocorporatists should also accept the notion that a company has a greater responsibility than stipulated by law because this is the key idea behind agreements between social partners which go beyond legal regulations (see Brammer et al. 2012). Social partnership is based on free association (including free exit), and cannot be enforced by law in the same way that labour codes and tax obligations can be enforced. Yet, collective contracts are more formally binding than Carroll’s ‘ethical

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1 With the notion ‘neocorporatist’ we follow the definition in political science that distinguishes capital-labour arrangements in the 20th century from ‘old-style’ corporate societies (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982).
responsibilities’ – the next step in his pyramid – suggests. They lie between legal stipulations and social norms. If social partnership is not just enforced by external pressure, we should be able to identify executives that have a concept of responsibility in mind which combines the idea of going beyond legal stipulations with agreement to collective regulation (i.e. with a neocorporatist concept).

What Carroll calls ‘legal responsibilities’ is, in our understanding, not a separate concept of corporate responsibility independent from economic responsibility or the high-CSR commitment concepts, but its interaction with the other concepts in order to get them consistent. Minimalists might be rule-obeying, as well as inclined to break rules in order to get ahead. As liberals as well as neocorporatists ‘go beyond what is required by law’ by definition, they should also be rule-obeying people.

The etatist concept is a fourth concept of responsibility, distinct from the other concepts because it does directly not refer to the responsibility of companies. Etatists agree to a stark state regulation and redistribution, which may then have an impact on how they view corporate responsibility to the society. Minimalists instead might follow Milton Friedman (1973) and reject state intervention in the economy. Yet, since minimalists restrict their provision of public goods to the provision of employment and tax payments, they might also agree with etatist that the state is in charge of everything else. Followers of a liberal concept of responsibility should clearly reject state intervention in order to be consistent, so do neocorporatists, since collective (self-)regulation implies a search for solutions that make this intervention superfluous.

Based on these conceptualizations, we explore four sets of hypotheses:

1. We expect that the neocorporatist concept is widespread in Germany, while minimalists are relatively more frequent in Poland and Hungary, with East Germany placed somewhere in the middle. This should be particularly true for privately owned and medium-sized companies since they usually lack the resources needed for a high CSR commitment and are particularly suspicious towards unions. We further expect that Polish and Hungarian minimalists are less often true ‘Friedmanites’ and might more often struggle with obedience of formal rules (North 1990) than their German counterparts, both for economic reasons but also due institutional legacies that nurtured a high degree of informal behaviour (see Berniak-Wozny 2010; Giordano and Hayoz 2013; Janky and Lengyel 2014). Following the argument of path dependency we assume that etatists are more widespread in a post-socialist context than in West Germany. Following the argument of an ideological turn towards an individualistic approach to CSR, we
should be able to identify the liberal concept in all three countries, especially in large companies.

2. In terms of CSR practices, we expect that explicit CSR is more developed in West Germany than in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and relatively more in large companies and banks than in medium-sized companies. If CSR is more ceremonial, then we should find a gap between practices and branding. We expect this to happen more often in Poland and Hungary than in Germany. If cultural underpinnings matter for CSR practices, then we should find a correspondence between cognitive concepts and CSR practices. An approach that goes more in the direction of explicit CSR should correspond with a liberal concept of corporate responsibility, while executives with a neocorporatist concept may be inclined to practice the implicit form of CSR without much modern branding. Minimalists and etatists should perform relatively few CSR activities.

3. According to the CSR literature, it can be assumed that exposure to transnational influence (of companies and executives) fosters the adoption of explicit CSR in all three countries, but particularly so in the post-socialist context. The greater the exposure to transnational influence, the more explicit CSR (or at least branding) should be present. This might occur in particular when companies are strongly integrated in the supply chains of multinational companies. If the adoption of CSR is more ceremonial, companies should do more CSR branding relative to the CSR they actually perform. Again, we expect a ceremonial pattern to be more likely in Poland and Hungary than in West Germany.

4. Regarding collective labour arrangements, we expect that companies which participate in such institutions, and have executives who assess this involvement positively, tend to stress internal, labour-related issues and care less about branding. If labour-relation institutions are more important than the executives’ neocorporatist concept, then the institutional effect should play a greater role. If explicit CSR and organized labour tend to be mutually exclusive, we should find more explicit CSR strategies and branding in those companies which stand outside of collective arrangements.
2. Methodology

2.1. The Sample

The survey was conducted in West and East Germany, Hungary and Poland by three teams2.

In each country, the teams gathered data about organizational features of the companies (e.g. size, export share, ownership, labour representation, and CSR activities) and the executives (attitudes, age, educational background, status as owner or employed manager, and honorary positions). Expatriates from other countries were not approached from the beginning. The questionnaire was first developed in English and then translated into the three languages. The translations were cross-checked.

There are four types of companies in the study. Three of these are located in the core industrial sectors of the countries and are classified by size: medium-sized companies (45 to 249 employees); large companies (250 to 999 employees); very large companies (1,000 employees and more). In addition, we grouped banks and insurance companies in a fourth type of company independent from the number of employees. We assume that the attitudes of their executives and their CSR practises differ from manufacturing companies. However, the group is too small to be split into additional subtypes.

For the very large companies, we took the most reliable top-500 lists in each country and contacting the very largest firms first. The large and medium-sized companies were selected from country-specific pools of company addresses. The manufacturing sector is mainly represented by mechanical engineering, metalworking, and the electrical, chemical, and food industries, with some national peculiarities. The original company sample consists of 857 companies: 165 companies in Poland, 169 in Hungary, 244 in East Germany and 279 in the West. The majority of companies are medium-sized (500 companies), followed by large companies (145

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2 The project was developed in the Collaborative Research Centre 580 in Jena. György Lengyel was responsible for the Hungarian survey, Krzysztof Jasiecki for the Polish survey, and Katharina Bluhm, Bernd Martens and Vera Trappmann for the German survey. The survey was conducted at the end of 2009 and throughout 2010. Funding of the empirical research by the German Research Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.
companies), very large companies (129) and 83 banks and insurance companies. Companies are selected according to their location, i.e. not by ownership.

Due to the study’s combination of organizational features and subjective attitudes, it was vital to reach the first hierarchal level (CEOs, managing directors, other members of the board of managers, and entrepreneurs). We succeeded in this in 90% of the medium-sized companies and 80% of the very large companies; the success rates for large companies and banks lie in between these figures. We established a second sample comprised of executives that refers strictly to the first hierarchal level only. For the executive sample we also rearranged the German respondents. The German sample is no longer separated by the location of the company in the East or West but by the executives’ geographical origins. This was necessary because West Germans manage around one-third of East German companies. East German executives, in contrast, rarely manage West German companies. The new sample of executives includes 300 West Germans, 145 East Germans (only one banker and one executive of a very large company), 163 Polish and 139 Hungarian executives. The executive sample is used when we refer to individual characteristics or attitudes. We use the original sample whenever we study only CSR activities.

2.2. Operationalization of Attitudes

The premise of this research is that there is a relation between companies’ practices of corporate responsibility and the attitudes of their executives towards the role of companies in the wider society. Scholars on CSR conceptualize the relationship between attitudes and practices as the cultural underpinning of CSR (cf. Matten and Moon 2008). Yet, sociological studies on attitudes indicate that values do not determine action (cf. Bohner 2001), i.e. attitudes and CSR practises might not fit. Hence, we first study the concepts of responsibility separately and use them as independent variables for CSR activities.

To study the concepts of responsibility we use 5-point Likert scales and the answers were recoded as binary responses (agree/disagree) according to theoretical considerations. The minimalist concept is operationalized with the item: ‘The social responsibility of companies consists only of increasing profit’ (agreement³). Respondents who, in addition to agreeing with this item, clearly rejected the statement

³ Agreement is coded with 1 and 2 of the 5-Likert scale. If agreement includes the undecided responses (3 of the Likert Scale), it is separately stressed.
‘Companies have to do more for the community than what is required by law’ we named ‘strict minimalist’ because they oppose what the CSR literature regards as decisive for contemporary CSR – the readiness to voluntarily go beyond that level.

Both, the liberal and the neocorporatist concept of corporate responsibility differ from a minimalist view in their commitment to go beyond legal requirements. Therefore, liberals and neocorporatists should agree with two statements: 1) ‘a company has to do more for the community than what is required by law’; and 2) ‘Voluntary commitment to social and environmental issues is even in time of a crisis an indispensable part of a company’s strategy’. However, they should show a different attitudes to the acceptance of collective labour arrangements, which we operationalized with the following third and fourth statement; 3) ‘Collective regulations between social partners are important for the functioning of the economy’ (disagreement and undecided: liberal; agreement: neocorporatist); 4) ‘Trade unions are superfluous’ (agreement and undecided: liberal; disagreement: neocorporatist).

The Etatist concept is operationalized with two items: 1) ‘The government should monitor and regulate the economy’ (agreement); 2) ‘The socio-political responsibilities of the state can only be achieved through the redistribution of wealth’ (agreement). As a statement about law-breaking is likely to elicit a safe rather than always a truthful reply, we operationalized legal responsibility with a weaker statement, which was already used in earlier Hungarian surveys: ‘One has to break rules if one wants to get ahead’ (see Janky and Lengyel 2014). Executives with a strong rule-obedient attitude should clearly reject this statement.

2.3. Operationalization of CSR Activities and Explanatory Variables

The measurement of CSR activities with a questionnaire has clear limits due to the lack of control over what is reported. Yet, we can at least differentiate between reported CSR activities, their strategic character, and branding. Following the precedent of the Green Paper of the European Commission (EC 2001), we distinguish between internal and external activities. Using multiple-choice scales, we take five objectives the respondents claim to promote in their daily business as indicators for internal CSR: management of environmental impacts and natural resources; health and safety at work; training and long-life learning; socially responsible restructuring; and work-life balance. For external CSR we asked the respondents if their company is involved
in: supporting social activities in the community; environmental issues; public and political debate; regional development; sport sponsorship; cultural sponsorship; health care provisions; and anti-corruption efforts. In both scales, we integrated an open category that allowed the respondents to add anything they considered was missing from the list. With these two indices, we follow the broad understanding of CSR that fits to companies of different sectors and size and includes Carroll’s philanthropic level of CSR, often also branded as Corporate Citizenship. The two lists of activities, however, do not refer to either of these terms.

From these two lists, we build indices of CSR commitment. We first operationalize ‘high CSR commitment’ by coding two levels. Companies with more CSR activities than the median are coded as doing ‘much CSR’ (the company claims to promote more items than the median of companies in the same country). The most active companies we record as engaged in ‘very much CSR’ (i.e. the company claims to promote more items than the 75th percentile of companies in the same country). As the group of ‘very much’ CSR turned out to be too small for a separate multivariate analysis, we rely on the lower threshold in order to identify high CSR commitment.

In addition we want to know a) if companies have names for their activities (such as CSR, Corporate Citizenship, Ethical Business, Sustainability, Codes of Conduct), or if they have ‘no special concept’; b) if they provide a regular budget for their activities; and c) if they operate more on an ad hoc basis or perceive their activities as part of the company’s strategy, which suggests a greater integration of CSR within the core business (see Halme and Laurila 2009). We take the answers to these questions as very basic proxies for an increasingly strategic approach towards CSR (i.e. for explicit CSR) that is also realistic for smaller companies. We further assume that if companies claim ‘much CSR’ but do not consider these activities part of their corporate strategy or give them a label, then they pursue implicit CSR.

Combining all this, we constructed five groups of CSR activities that we use as dependent variables: I) much internal CSR, II) much external CSR; III) much internal and external CSR; IV) much internal and external CSR plus a brand; V) much internal and external CSR plus a brand, budget and an integration of CSR in the corporate strategy. In order to operationalize a difference between substantive CSR and a ceremonial commitment to CSR, we constructed a sixth group that includes all companies who claim to have a label of their activities independently from the reported CSR activities (branding).

Transnational influence is operationalized with market influence (export share) and organizational influence (foreign ownership), but also with the personal experience on the part of the executives abroad (education and work). Collective
labour arrangements compromises memberships in employers’ association and the existence of works’ councils or union committees.

3. Empirical Findings

3.1. Attitudes Towards Corporate Responsibility

The four theoretical concepts of corporate responsibility cover slightly more than half of the respondents in our executive sample. Among the executives for whom we can code a concept, medium-sized companies are slightly underrepresented, whereas executives from very large companies and banks are slightly overrepresented.

3.1.1. The Neocorporatist Concept

In absolute terms, the neocorporatists represent the largest group of executives whom we could classify according to one of our concepts (126 of 386 executives). Yet, they represent only 17% of the entire executive sample. As expected, we find the highest percentage of neocorporatists in West Germany. But even here, we cover only one quarter of the executive sample (in contrast to 11% of the East Germans, 10% of the Hungarians and 13% of the Polish executives). The logit model in Table 1 reveals that for Polish and Hungarian executives the odds of belonging to the group of neocorporatists – that is, the probability of being a neocorporatist over the probability of not being a neocorporatist – decrease by more than 60%. East Germans also deviate negatively from the West German reference group, but this difference is not statistically significant\(^4\). The percentages of Polish, East German and Hungarian neocorporatists range from 12.7% to 10%.

The odds of being a neocorporatist double with company size. Executives of large companies have twice higher odds of being classified as neocorporatists than the reference group of German executives in medium-sized companies. For executives of very large companies the effect is even larger, there the odds are four times higher. Surprisingly, for bankers the odds of belonging to this group are about six times higher (see Table 1).

\(^4\) All regressions were performed using the GNU R package 2.13.1. We thank Hans Christian Heinemeyer for his help.
Table 1. Basic logit model for cognitive concepts of corporate responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variablea</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Neocorporatist</th>
<th>Etatist</th>
<th>Minimalist</th>
<th>Strict minimalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-Germans</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>-0.431</td>
<td>1.138</td>
<td>0.649*</td>
<td>0.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
<td>(0.319)</td>
<td>(0.779)</td>
<td>(0.349*)</td>
<td>(0.466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>-1.149***</td>
<td>3.950***</td>
<td>1.172***</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
<td>(0.613)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
<td>-0.969***</td>
<td>3.202***</td>
<td>1.709***</td>
<td>1.451***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.377)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(0.615)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large companiesb</td>
<td>-0.430</td>
<td>0.771***</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.455*</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large companiesc</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>1.457***</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>-0.370</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>-0.557</td>
<td>1.819***</td>
<td>-0.207</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
<td>(0.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
a Reference category: West German executives in medium-sized companies.
b ≥ 250 employees
c ≥ 1,000 employees

All estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model. They represent the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept was omitted from the table. The asterisk denotes the following levels of statistical significance: * – p < 0.10, ** – p < 0.05, *** – p < 0.01. The Pseudo-R² was calculated following Nagelkerke (1991).

We added other explanatory variables to these basic logit models explaining the different responsibility concepts (for a more detailed analysis see Bluhm and Trappmann 2014). It turns out that ownership shares are also good predictors of group membership. For an executive who owns 25% or more of the company’s shares the odds of being a neocorporatist decrease by 47% (−0.636*** compared to an executive who does not have any shares (controlling for country effects and company type). We observe a similar effect when a family owns the shares (−0.618**). In Hungary, domestic ownership (in contrast to foreign ownership) is also a significant predictor for not belonging in the neocorporatist camp (−1.509*). Hence, the expected effects regarding company size and ownership are confirmed.

Neocorporatists do not support state intervention in the economy and redistribution of wealth by the state, which means that there is little overlap with the etatist concept. Only eight neocorporatists (out of a total of 126) agree with market regulation and redistribution by the state. Ten executives of those classified as neocorporatist are positively inclined towards the statement: ‘Social responsibility of companies consists only of increasing profits’. Therefore, they are also classified
as minimalists, but not strict minimalists. In spite of this unanticipated overlap, the neocorporatist concept is (empirically) the most clearly delineated from the others.

3.1.2. The minimalist concept

Minimalists are the second largest group of this subsample of executives. They represent about 15% of the executive sample (122 respondents), which in turn implies that a vast majority of executives reject this very restrictive view about a company’s responsibility within society. The country effects are statistically significant and comparatively large (see Table 1). As predicted, East German, Hungarian and Polish executives are significantly more likely to be minimalists than members of the reference group of West German executives in medium-sized companies; the respective odds approximately double, triple and quadruple. Almost half of the minimalists (53 executives) agree to both classifying statements, i.e. they see profit making as the only responsibility of a company and reject the idea that a company has to do more than required by law, making them strict minimalists. There is little significant variation in this category, but being from Poland more than quadruples the odds of being classified as part of this group.

In terms of company type, executives of very large companies are somewhat less likely to be minimalists, although this difference is not statistically significant. Hence, one cannot simply argue that minimalists generally lead smaller businesses and therefore lack the resources to do more CSR. In terms of company ownership, domestic and partly foreign-owned companies (foreigners owning 25 to 99% of the shares) are more likely to be in the minimalist group compared to full subsidiaries. Yet, only for the latter the results are significant (0.245 and 1.071**, respectively). Again significant is the result for executives of family businesses (0.689*). Otherwise, executives of publicly listed company are also more likely to be minimalists (1.569***). All of these auxiliary results allow for country effects and control for different company sizes and types.

Minimalists exhibit more overlap with the other concepts than the neocorporatists. 23 of the 112 minimalist executives also agree to state intervention, which is less than one might expect; 13 respondents also belong in the group of liberals and 10 to the neocorporatists. The overlap decreases substantially if we only consider the 53 strict minimalists.

3.1.3. The Etatist Concept

There are 82 etatists who represent approximately 11% of the executive sample. In contrast to the minimalists, there is little overlap between this group and the other
high-commitment concepts. Hungarians and Poles are strikingly more likely to be classified as etatists than members of the West German reference group; the respective odds approximately increase by factors 24 and 52. Very large companies and banks are not significantly more likely to be in favour of state intervention. Yet, the estimated coefficients suggest that for domestic companies without any foreign capital the odds to be part of this group are about twice as high compared to companies financed through foreign capital (0.734**). We do not observe a significant relationship with state ownership.

3.1.4. The Liberal Concept

Statistically speaking, the liberal concept of corporate responsibility produces the least informative outcomes. 66 executives are classified as liberals (approximately 9% of the executive sample). Table 1 suggests that there is no significant variation among the other countries relative to West Germany. Company size and type are not significant predictors. Contrary to our expectation, there is some overlap with etatists (7 executives) and minimalists (13 executives). A comparatively strong association exists between companies that are subsidiaries and liberal executives (−0.851***); the odds of being liberal decrease by about 43%. In other words, it seems a) that a liberal concept of responsibility is not particularly widespread and b) our basic models do not include many covariates that are associated with liberal executives.

3.1.5. Legal Responsibility

A stunning 42% of the respondents in the executive sample accept the need to break rules in order to get ahead. Acceptance is highest in Poland (48%) and in medium-sized companies (45%). This prompts us to add the legal-responsibility statement as an independent variable to our logit models (not reported in Table 1). Our expectations are empirically confirmed for the neocorporatists and minimalists, but not for the other types. The odds of belonging to the minimalist group more than double for executives who agree to the statement or are at least uncertain about it (0.964***). Rule breaking also more than doubles the odds of being classified as a strict minimalist (0.883***). Breaking the rules is negatively associated with neocorporatists. Agreeing to this statement halves the odds of being a neocorporatist (−0.557**). Rule breaking has no statistically significant effect on the odds of being an etatist or liberal, which indicates a high level of incoherence among group that we label ‘liberal’ with respect to their attitudes towards corporate responsibility. As usual, these auxiliary results also allow for country effects and control for company size and type.
3.2. CSR activities and concepts of responsibility as explanatory variable

3.2.1. Variation in CSR activities

In the second step of the multivariate analysis, we run logit regressions of each of the six groups of CSR activities, ordered from I to V on the basis of CSR activities and an additional group on branding, on the country where the company is located and the company type. As no subjective features of the executives are involved, we use the original (and larger) company sample.

Table 2. Basic logit model for CSR activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Group I</th>
<th>Group II</th>
<th>Group III</th>
<th>Group IV</th>
<th>Group V</th>
<th>Branding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-Germans</td>
<td>−0.263  (0.2)</td>
<td>0.406*  (0.199)</td>
<td>−0.085  0.218</td>
<td>−0.19  (0.291)</td>
<td>0.403  (0.305)</td>
<td>−0.075  (0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>−1.705***  (0.253)</td>
<td>−1.4***  (0.221)</td>
<td>−1.714***  (0.298)</td>
<td>−0.831**  (0.315)</td>
<td>−0.922**  (0.358)</td>
<td>2.878***  (0.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>−3.171***  (0.408)</td>
<td>−1.909***  (0.237)</td>
<td>−2.871***  (0.439)</td>
<td>−2.219***  (0.485)</td>
<td>−3.513***  (1.017)</td>
<td>2.043***  (0.283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large companies</td>
<td>0.51*  (0.224)</td>
<td>0.497*  (0.212)</td>
<td>0.821***  (0.237)</td>
<td>0.899**  (0.298)</td>
<td>1.039***  (0.316)</td>
<td>0.075  (0.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large companies</td>
<td>1.123***  (0.251)</td>
<td>1.35***  (0.241)</td>
<td>1.586***  (0.262)</td>
<td>2.095***  (0.292)</td>
<td>1.836***  (0.339)</td>
<td>1.496***  (0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>−0.023  (0.311)</td>
<td>1.519***  (0.283)</td>
<td>0.47  (0.331)</td>
<td>0.487  (0.422)</td>
<td>1.597***  (0.394)</td>
<td>0.159  (0.304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Reference category: West German medium-sized companies. All estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model. They represent the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept was omitted from the table. The asterisk denotes the following levels of statistical significance: * – p < 0.10, ** – p < 0.05, *** – p < 0.01. The Pseudo-R² was calculated following Nagelkerke (1991).

As expected, very large companies are significantly more likely to be highly committed to CSR in any of the five groups than the reference group of medium-sized German companies. The odds at least triple, but often the effect sizes are considerably larger. Banks and insurance companies are more likely to put an emphasis on external CSR, which may be explained by the tradition of charitable giving within the banking
sector; the odds of belonging to groups II and V quadruple for banks. East German, Hungarian and Polish manufacturing companies are significantly less likely to engage in any of the five CSR groups than the West German reference group. Polish companies are least active in this regard, particularly when it comes to internal CSR (group I).

Descriptive statistics of the CSR activities reveal that Hungarian and Polish companies are slightly more active in the traditional fields of philanthropy (community support, sport and cultural sponsoring) than German companies. Yet they less often report involvement in regional development projects, in socially responsible restructuring of the company and in activities to improve the work-life balance of their employees. If we consider the branding of activities independently from the other declared CSR activities, then we find a very strong relationship – economically and statistically – between the company’s location in Poland and Hungary with CSR and CC as a brand for their activities (Table 3). In short, companies in Poland and Hungary do less and more traditional CSR but more often refer to it using a contemporary brand. This signifies a greater ceremonial adoption of CSR.

Table 3. Logit model for branding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>CSR</th>
<th>CC</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Ethical management</th>
<th>Code of Conduct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-Germans</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>-0.511</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.297)</td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.7***</td>
<td>4.367***</td>
<td>0.493*</td>
<td>1.669***</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.927***</td>
<td>1.806***</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.917***</td>
<td>-0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large companiesb</td>
<td>0.559*</td>
<td>0.771***</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.455*</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large companiesc</td>
<td>1.884 ***</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.613*</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>1.076***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>1.85***</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.669*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

* Reference category: West German business medium-sized companies.
All estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model. They represent the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. The intercept was omitted from the table. The asterisk denotes the following levels of statistical significance: * − p < 0.10, ** − p < 0.05, *** − p < 0.01. The Pseudo-R² was calculated following Nagelkerke (1991).
3.2.2. Concepts as Explanatory Variable for CSR Commitment

If the notion ‘companies should do more for the wider society than required by law’ is accepted by the executives, then this should be reflected in the CSR activities of the companies. Hence, we expect that executives who belong to one of two high-commitment concepts will also stand out in terms of CSR activities with some interesting variations. We expect that ‘liberals’ stress the explicit, strategic dimension more than neocorporatists, while minimalists report less CSR activities, along with etatists, who might tend in a similar direction. We test these predictions by adding each concept separately as an independent variable to the logit models of CSR activities.

Our expectation is fully confirmed in the case of neocorporatists. Allowing for country effect and controlling for company size, we find that the odds of having a high commitment to CSR more than double if the executive is a neocorporatist, e.g. ranging from 0.906*** in the group I of much internal CSR activities; 1.095*** in the much external CSR (II); 1.091*** in group of much internal and external CSR (III); 0.96*** group IV (including branding), and 1.171*** in group V, which includes much internal and external CSR as well as a CSR budget and an claimed integration into the corporate strategy. Neocorporatists not only lead companies with CSR scores above the median in each country; they perform better in every category. Yet, they favour explicit over implicit CSR. Minimalists also seem to act in accordance with our expectations; their companies tend to perform less CSR than those lead by other types. This difference is only statistically significant in the case of strict minimalists and internal CSR (−0.895*). The liberal concept of responsibility is not robustly associated with any of the recorded activities, confirming the lack of consistency identified earlier.

3.3. Transnational Influence and Social Partnership as Explanatory Variables

We further extend our logit models of the various CSR activities in order to test the effects of transnational influence and collective labour arrangements on the level of CSR commitment. We now use the executive sample as individual features and attitudes are included.
3.3.1. Transnational Influence

Transnational influence is operationalized as integration in the international economy (export share, foreign ownership) and socialization of the management abroad. Following the neo-institutionalist literature, we assume that both channels might be relevant. Exporting is the weakest form of transnational integration and the direct influence of multinationals increases with the level of their investment (see Lim and Tsutsui 2012). Hence, we take 100% foreign ownership as an indication of substantial long-term investments in the subsidiary. 25–99% of the shares are held by foreigners in partly foreign-owned companies. We classify every foreign share below this level as ‘domestic’, as we consider it very probable that such limited foreign participation does not involve a transfer of ‘best practices’. Furthermore, European Works Councils (EWCs) are an important transnational road of communication between different locations in Europe. They are also a proxy for multinational companies, since EWCs need only be established in companies which have at least 150 employees in at least two EU countries each (according to the EWC directive from the EU).

To analyse transnational influence via socialization, we examine if studying abroad, particularly in an Anglo-Saxon environment, has any effect on CSR activities. In a first analysis, we also included the time spent working abroad, the company’s location abroad, the time spent studying abroad, and the number of advisory posts in a foreign country. But this usually resulted in too few observations or no discernable effects. Therefore, these variables were omitted and we report only the simpler models in Table 4.

Table 4 reveals mixed results. High export shares are neither significantly correlated with higher CSR activities, nor with more CSR branding. EWCs seem to have a positive effect on CSR activities but these results are not robust and not statistically significant. Only complete foreign ownership increases the probability of high CSR activities in a country (groups III, IV, and V). The interaction analysis shows no significant differences between foreign investment or high-export companies in Poland and Hungary vis-à-vis West Germany. Only when East Germans manage a full subsidiary we found significant positive deviations from the reference group regarding internal and external CSR (group I–III). Thus, one cannot say that Polish and Hungarian companies, which are integrated in western supply chains, do per se more CSR than their domestic counterparts.
### Table 4. Logit model for transnational influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Group I</th>
<th>Group II</th>
<th>Group III</th>
<th>Group IV</th>
<th>Group V</th>
<th>Branding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partly foreign-owned</td>
<td>0.246 (0.452)</td>
<td>−0.536 (0.377)</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.511)</td>
<td>0.319 (0.625)</td>
<td>−0.23 (0.709)</td>
<td>0.132 (0.475)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely foreign-owned</td>
<td>0.425 (0.278)</td>
<td>−0.004 (0.253)</td>
<td>0.665** (0.291)</td>
<td>0.606* (0.353)</td>
<td>0.753** (0.366)</td>
<td>0.125 (0.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export share</td>
<td>−0.006* (0.003)</td>
<td>−0.004 (0.003)</td>
<td>−0.005 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.865)</td>
<td>−0.004 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Works Councils</td>
<td>0.649 (0.641)</td>
<td>0.5 (0.626)</td>
<td>0.614 (0.637)</td>
<td>0.699 (0.648)</td>
<td>1.044 (0.685)</td>
<td>1.387 (1.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study abroad and more</td>
<td>−0.235 (0.37)</td>
<td>0.319 (0.323)</td>
<td>−0.138 (0.395)</td>
<td>−0.049 (0.917)</td>
<td>−0.862 (0.65)</td>
<td>0.301 (0.372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study in US/UK</td>
<td>1.221** (0.484)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.437)</td>
<td>1.079** (0.501)</td>
<td>1.382*** (0.017)</td>
<td>2.026*** (0.729)</td>
<td>0.062 (0.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo- R²</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

- Reference category: West German executives in medium-sized companies.
- Reference category: Domestic companies (with less than 25% foreign capital).

All estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model. They represent the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include country effects and control for company types/size. The intercept was omitted from the table. The asterisk denotes the following levels of statistical significance: * – p < 0.10, ** – p < 0.05, *** – p < 0.01. The Pseudo-R² was calculated following Nagelkerke (1991).

The only personal experience of executives that has a significant effect on CSR is having studied at a UK or US university. This effect is economically very strong, leading to at least a tripling of the odds of most CSR activities apart from group II foreign ownership and studying in the US/UK are statistically different. Wald tests reject the null hypothesis that the difference of the coefficients is zero (whenever the coefficient on studying abroad is significant). Based on this, we conclude that Anglo-Saxon education supports the adoption of global practices.

To assess the influence of labour relations we also combine institutional and individual characteristics. Our proxies for institutional effects are membership...
in an employers’ association and the existence of formal labour representation. If these two matter more than executive perceptions, their effects should be larger (and potentially more significant) than those of the individual features. To this we add the executives’ perception of the works council or union committees. If labour representation has a positive impact on CSR activities, while the executives regard the existing labour representation in their companies as superfluous, one might argue for an even stronger institutional effect. In addition, we include both the neocorporatist concept and the variable measuring the number of honorary posts in order to control for certain personal (pre)dispositions. We control for age, since younger executives might be less in favour of collectivistic approaches to corporate responsibility.

Table 5. Logit model for the impact of collective labour arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Group I</th>
<th>Group II</th>
<th>Group III</th>
<th>Group IV</th>
<th>Group V</th>
<th>Branding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership in employers’ association</td>
<td>0.738** (0.308)</td>
<td>0.31 (0.316)</td>
<td>0.641** (0.328)</td>
<td>0.752* (0.42)</td>
<td>0.306 (0.435)</td>
<td>0.219 (0.312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works council/union committees</td>
<td>0.502** (0.222)</td>
<td>0.231 (0.205)</td>
<td>0.512** (0.251)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.337)</td>
<td>0.399 (0.352)</td>
<td>−0.157 (0.218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement ‘Works councils /trade union committees are superfluous’</td>
<td>−0.05 (0.38)</td>
<td>−0.374 (0.35)</td>
<td>−0.31 (0.477)</td>
<td>0.765* (0.464)</td>
<td>−0.801 (0.772)</td>
<td>0.64 (0.392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary posts</td>
<td>0.187 (0.191)</td>
<td>0.496*** (0.183)</td>
<td>0.426** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.262)</td>
<td>0.436 (0.271)</td>
<td>0.228 (0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (45 years old and younger)</td>
<td>−0.058 (0.215)</td>
<td>−0.168 (0.2)</td>
<td>−0.251 (0.294)</td>
<td>−0.074 (0.29)</td>
<td>−0.148 (0.314)</td>
<td>0.106 (0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neocorporatist concept</td>
<td>1.096** (0.472)</td>
<td>1.389*** (0.52)</td>
<td>1.257*** (0.007)</td>
<td>1.352** (0.561)</td>
<td>1.048* (0.603)</td>
<td>0.163 (0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo- R²</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reference category: West German executives in medium-sized companies.

All estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model. They represent the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include county effects and control for company types/size. The intercept was omitted from the table. Interactions with neocorporatist concept, membership in an employers’ association and sector/size were omitted from the table. The asterisk denotes the following levels of statistical significance: * – p < 0.10, ** – p < 0.05, *** – p < 0.01. The Pseudo-R² was calculated following Nagelkerke (1991).

---

6 As an initial step, we first tested a larger multivariate model testing different forms of labour representation (works councils, trade union committees in Poland and Hungary, EWCs). We ultimately selected simpler models, since this differentiation would lead to very small sample sizes.
Table 5 shows that collective self-regulation has a positive impact on CSR. Membership in employers’ associations and the existence of works councils/unions significantly increases the odds of having ‘much internal’ CSR (group I) and ‘much internal and external’ CSR (group III), by about factor two in both cases. The latter result is likely to be driven by internal activities, which is underscored by a similar effect of employers’ associations on companies where executives report to be engaged in much internal and external CSR and have a brand for their activities (group IV). This effect vanishes only when we look at the subset of companies that (claim to) have a CSR budget and integrate CSR in the corporate strategy (group V). Since we always allow for country effects and control for company size, we may interpret this as a ‘complementary institutional effect’. A caveat worth noting is that the number of companies which are a member in employers’ associations is comparatively low in both Poland and Hungary (see Trappmann et al. 2014: 198–199). Polish members of an employers’ association deviate negatively from those who are not members of an employers’ association.

Existing collective arrangements seems to be more important for CSR than their assessment by the executives. However, neocorporatists have again the strongest influence on CSR commitment across the executive sample. The effects are statistically significant for all groups (but not branding) and economically large; the odds approximately triple in all cases. Additional results reveal that Hungarian neocorporatists deviate positively from the mean effect of neocorporatists in general and Hungarian companies in particular. Honorary posts of executives correspond to high external CSR performance, whereas age does not play a significant role. These results confirm and underline our previous finding that a neocorporatist concept corresponds to a level of activity in all aspects of CSR.

We conducted three additional tests. First, we estimated these models without the West German cases to see if the effect is distorted by West German companies, which typically have stronger works councils and a higher percentage of membership in employers’ associations. The results are robust to this perturbation and the direction of the estimated coefficients remains the same. Secondly, we wanted to learn more about two explanatory factors – organized labour and the neocorporatist concept. We tested whether the effect of having a labour institution and a neocorporatist set of ideas are linked or if their influence is independent. They are not interrelated; an interaction of organized labour with neocorporatism is statistically insignificant.
in all cases. After that, we wanted to know if the effect of labour institutions or the neocorporatist concept is stronger. Our results suggest that, only in the case of external CSR and more explicit CSR, executives’ attitudes have stronger effects than institutionalized labour representation.

4. Discussion and Conclusion

In institutional theory, it is widely accepted that institutions need interpretation by actors and that these interpretations represent a source of institutional change (Denzau and North 1994). The debate on varieties of CSR lives from the assumption that in spite of global isomorphic pressure (Meyer 2010), institutional and cultural context matter. In our paper we have tried to explore the attitudes of executives – who have to have a strong imprint on the practices of their companies – and to link these attitudes to reported CSR activities. For this purpose we theoretically developed cognitive concepts of responsibility that are inspired by the CSR literature.

As predicted, we find the minimalist concept significantly more widespread in a post-socialist context, least so in East Germany, most often among Polish executives. The lack of resources of medium-sized companies, in contrast, does not provide a sufficient explanation of the variation of CSR activities. Minimalism has also little to do with Friedman’s narrow idea of corporate responsibility. Hungarian and Polish minimalists in particular show a greater propensity to rule-breaking and overlap with etatists who have the most statistical weight in the two countries. This combination sets them apart from the East Germans who are closer in this regard to their West German counterparts.

The hypothesis of a notable continuity of implicit CSR in Germany compared to Hungary and Poland could be confirmed. Germans claim to do more and label less. Moreover, the findings also confirm that in all three countries organized labour supports more internal and implicit CSR. However, labour representation is weak in Hungary, Poland and East Germany, and has also weakened in West Germany over the last two decades (cf. Schmidt 2008; Bluhm et al., 2014; Meardi 2011; Trappmann 2014; Trappmann et al. 2014). Hence, the spread of the found complementarity between collective arrangements and contemporary CSR should not be overrated.

West German companies also have a lead in explicit CSR in our sample. This may have to do with the head start of Germany in the adaptation of the new ‘best
practice’ and the greater economic power of the companies. Yet, the expectation that the spread of explicit CSR is accompanied by a clear turn towards an Anglo-Saxon individualistic approach to corporate responsibility could not be supported – not for Germany, not even for Poland which is often perceived as the most liberal among our three countries (see Jasiecki, 2014). In the German case and to weaker extent also in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, contemporary CSR go well together with neocorporatist views on corporate responsibility that again points against simple substitution.

In Poland and Hungary a ‘ceremonial commitment’ to CSR is quite widespread which speaks for three effects: First, the CSR discourse fed by the EU and national politics is effective in the two countries. Even smaller companies see a need to claim to be doing CSR. Second, so far there is a weak cultural underpinning for contemporary explicit CSR, although individual socialization in an Anglo-Saxon country seems to influence the substantive introduction of explicit CSR. Third, the high degree of transnationalization of these economies seems to have a positive impact on the diffusion of CSR which is not just ceremonial. Yet, this effect is weaker than expected. Only full subsidiaries stand out and this occurs in all three countries. Moreover, the influence of multinationals on the adoption of CSR is not a phenomenon of the ‘dependent market economy’ only (Nölke and Vliegenthardt, 2009). The particular exposure of subsidiaries to transnational influences and their high visibility in the host-country might be important for this result.

References


